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Abstract
In this paper we consider a quantum computational variant of nondeterminism based on the
notion of a quantum proof, which is a quantum state that plays a role similar to a certificate in
an NP-type proof. Specifically, we consider quantum proofs for properties of black-box groups,
which are finite groups whose elements are encoded as strings of a given length and whose group
operations are performed by a group oracle. We prove that for an arbitrary group oracle there
exist succinct (polynomial-length) quantum proofs for the Group Non-Membership problem that
can be checked with small error in polynomial time on a quantum computer. Classically this is
impossible—it is proved that there exists a group oracle relative to which this problem does not
have succinct proofs that can be checked classically with bounded error in polynomial time (i.e.,
the problem is not in MA relative to the group oracle constructed). By considering a certain
subproblem of the Group Non-Membership problem we obtain a simple proof that there exists
an oracle relative to which BQP is not contained in MA. Finally, we show that quantum proofs
for non-membership and classical proofs for various other group properties can be combined
to yield succinct quantum proofs for other group properties not having succinct proofs in the
classical setting, such as verifying that a number divides the order of a group and verifying that
a group is not a simple group.
1 Introduction
There are several equivalent ways to view nondeterminism in the classical setting that apparently
yield inequivalent notions in the quantum setting. Two such ways are as follows.
First, we may view a nondeterministic process as a probabilistic process, and consider whether
the resulting process has zero or nonzero probability of success. Along these lines, Adleman,
DeMarrais, and Huang [1] and Fenner, Green, Homer, and Pruim [18] have defined QNP to be the
class of languages L for which there exist polynomial time quantum Turing machines that accept
with nonzero probability if and only if the input is in L. This class coincides with the counting
class co-C= P [18, 19]. This notion of quantum nondeterminism has also been investigated recently
in the context of communication complexity and query complexity by de Wolf [28].
Second, we way view nondeterminism as it relates to verification. A common way to view NP
is that NP is the class of languages consisting of those strings for which there exist polynomial-
length proofs of membership that can be checked in polynomial time, and one may extend this
∗Research partially supported by Canada’s NSERC.
viewpoint to the quantum setting in several ways. For instance, we may consider quantum proofs
(or quantum certificates), which are quantum states that certify membership of strings in given
languages, or we may consider ordinary (classical) certificates that are checked by polynomial-time
quantum computers. In each case we may consider various constraints on the error allowed by the
quantum checking procedure.
In this paper, we investigate the second way of viewing nondeterminism in the quantum setting.
We will restrict our attention to the case where certificates may be quantum and the polynomial-
time quantum verification procedure may operate with (two-sided) bounded error. Thus, this
version of “quantum NP” represents the quantum generalization of the class MA (based on the
Arthur-Merlin games of Babai [4, 9]), and for this reason we will call the resulting class QMA.
This notion of quantum nondeterminism was apparently first discussed by Knill [24], and was later
studied by Kitaev [22] (who instead referred to the class we call QMA as BQNP). Kitaev proved
QMA ⊆ P#P , and we claim that the technique based on GapP functions used by Fortnow and
Rogers [19] to prove BQP ⊆ PP may be extended to prove QMA ⊆ PP (this result was obtained
jointly by A. Kitaev and the present author). One may also view QMA as a class that results
by considering (two-sided error) one-message quantum interactive proof systems [23, 27], in which
there is really no interaction since only one message is sent.
Our main focus is on the power of QMA in the context of black-box groups. Of particular
interest to us is the Group Non-Membership problem, which may be stated as follows:
Group Non-Membership (GNM)
Instance: Group elements g1, . . . , gk and h in some finite group G.
Question: Is h outside the group generated by g1, . . . , gk (i.e., is h 6∈ 〈g1, . . . , gk〉)?
The statement of this problem mentions neither the particular representation of group elements
used nor the underlying group or groups. While it is interesting to consider this problem in the
case that the group elements are represented in some natural way (e.g., by invertible matrices
over a finite field), we will consider the case that group elements are uniquely represented in some
arbitrary way by strings, and that we have at our disposal some oracle B (known as a group oracle)
that performs group operations for us (with each operation requiring a single step). In this setting,
we assume nothing can be learned about group elements by examining their representative strings
except whether or not two elements are distinct. For each n ∈ N there will correspond a group
consisting of some subset of the length n strings; this group will be denoted Bn and is called a
black-box group. Black-box groups were first considered by Babai and Szemere´di [10], and have
since been studied in several works [3, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Further details regarding black-box groups will
be discussed in the next section.
For a given group oracle B we let GNM(B) be the language consisting of all positive instances
of the Group Non-Membership problem relative to B. By the Reachability Theorem of Babai and
Szemere´di [10] it follows that GNM(B) ∈ co-NPB for any group oracle B. Furthermore, Babai
[5, 6] proved that GNM(B) ∈ AMB for any group oracle B, while there exists choices for the group
oracle B such that GNM(B) 6∈ BPPB and GNM(B) 6∈ NPB . In Section 4 we extend this result
slightly by constructing a group oracle B such that GNM(B) 6∈MAB .
In contrast to the fact that GNM(B) 6∈ MAB for some choices of the group oracle B, we
prove that GNM(B) ∈ QMAB for any group oracle B. Thus, for any black-box group G and
elements h, g1 . . . , gk ∈ G, there exists a polynomial-length quantum proof that h is not in the
group generated by g1, . . . , gk. This fact is proved in Section 3. Naturally, a similar result holds
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in case group elements are represented in any way that allows the group oracle to be replaced
by a polynomial-time computation, such as matrix groups over a finite field. For such groups it
is not known if GNM is in MA, although Babai [6] conjectures that in fact GNM ∈ NP∩ co-NP
in this restricted case. This conjecture is based on presently unproved conjectures relating to
the classification of finite simple groups. A polynomial-time algorithm is known for permutation
groups [26].
In certain limited cases it is possible to solve GNM in quantum polynomial time without the
help of a certificate, such as when k = 1 in the statement of the GNM problem. The oracle B we
construct in Section 4 in fact puts GNM(B) outside of MAB for this special case, and therefore
gives an oracle relative to which BQP 6⊆ MA. Bernstein and Vazirani [13] claimed a stronger result
(specifically that there exists an oracle relative to which EQP 6⊆ MA), but the proof has not yet
appeared.
Quantum proofs for group non-membership may be used to devise quantum proofs for other
group problems. Several such problems, include the problem of testing whether a given number
divides the order of a group, testing that one group is a proper subgroup of another, and testing
that a given group is not a simple group, are mentioned in Section 5.
2 Definitions
In this section we define the class QMA and discuss black-box groups in the context of quantum
circuits. We assume the reader is familiar with the quantum circuit model, and with basic notions
from complexity theory and group theory. For a detailed discussion of quantum circuits see Kitaev
[21]. (Readers not familiar with quantum computation may find the more introductory papers of
Berthiaume [15] and Cleve [17] helpful as well.) See, for example, Balca´zar, D´iaz, and Gabarro´
[11, 12] for background on complexity theory and, for example, Isaacs [20] for background on group
theory.
Let us begin by making clear our assumptions regarding uniformity of quantum circuits. A
family {Qx} of quantum circuits is said to be polynomial-time uniformly generated if there exists a
deterministic procedure that, on input x, outputs a description of Qx and runs in time polynomial
in |x|. (For simplicity we assume all input strings are over the alphabet Σ = {0, 1}.) It is assumed
that the circuits in such a family are composed of gates in some reasonable, universal, finite set of
quantum gates (for instance, the standard basis discussed by Kitaev [21] or the Shor basis discussed
by Boykin, et. al. [16]). In addition the circuits may include oracle gates as discussed below.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the size of any circuit in such a family is not more than the length
of that circuit’s description (i.e., no compact descriptions of large circuits are allowed), so that Qx
must have size polynomial in |x|. To make matters simple when dealing with oracle gates below,
we define the size of a quantum circuit to be the number of gates in the circuit plus the number of
qubits upon which the circuit acts.
When we describe quantum circuits, we do so in a high-level manner that may suggest that
measurements are taking place at various times during the circuit’s computation; such measure-
ments, however, do not occur and are assumed to be simulated in the sense described by Aharonov,
Kitaev, and Nisan [2].
For each circuit Qx, some number of the qubits upon which Qx acts are specified as input
qubits, and all other qubits are ancilla qubits. The input qubits are assumed to be initialized in
some specified input state |ψ〉, while all ancilla qubits are initialized to the |0〉 state. One of the
qubits is also specified as the output qubit and is assumed to be observed after the circuit has been
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applied. The probability that Qx accepts |ψ〉 is defined to be the probability that an observation
of the output qubit (in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis) yields 1, given that the input qubits are initially set
to |ψ〉.
We now define the class QMA as follows.
Definition 1 A language A ⊆ Σ∗ is in QMA if there exists a polynomial-time uniformly gen-
erated family of quantum circuits {Qx}x∈Σ∗ such that (i) if x ∈ A then there exists a quantum
state |ψ〉 such that Pr[Qx accepts |ψ〉] > 2/3, and (ii) if x 6∈ A then for all quantum states |ψ〉,
Pr[Qx accepts |ψ〉] < 1/3.
Note that the circuit Qx does not take x as an input, but rather the procedure that produces the
description of Qx takes x as input—the input |ψ〉 to a given circuit Qx corresponds to a quantum
certificate that purportedly proves the property that x ∈ A. Information regarding x may of course
be “hard-coded” into Qx, however, which eliminates the need for inputting x. It should be noted
that the class QMA would not change if the definition was such that there were just one circuit for
each input length (rather than each input), with each circuit taking |ψ〉 and x as input (as would
be the case for the more standard notion of circuit uniformity).
Similar to classical bounded error classes, the bounds of 1/3 and 2/3 in the definition of
QMA may be replaced by 2−p(|x|) and 1 − 2−p(|x|), respectively, for any polynomial p. In the
other direction, the bounds of 1/3 and 2/3 may be replaced by functions b(|x|) and a(|x|), re-
spectively, for a, b : Z+ → [0, 1] such that (i) a and b are computable in polynomial time, and
(ii) a(|x|)− b(|x|) ≥ 1/p(|x|) for some polynomial p. In both cases, this follows from the fact that
for any polynomial q we may run q(|x|) independent copies of a given verification procedure on
a “compound certificate” consisting of q(|x|) certificates for the independent copies, and make a
decision to accept or reject depending on the proportion of the individual copies that accept appro-
priately. A simple analysis reveals that entanglement among the individual certificates can yield
no increase in the probability of acceptance as compared to the situation in which the certificates
are not entangled, and that the probability of error is bounded by the tail of a binomial series as
expected.
Next we will discuss black-box groups. Here, we will consider a variation on black-box groups
that is appropriate for the quantum circuit model. A group oracle B is a family of bijections {Bn}
with each member having the form Bn : Σ
2n+2 → Σ2n+2 and satisfying constraints to be discussed
shortly. We interpret the input and output of each Bn as consisting of four parts: a control bit, an
error bit, and two n-bit strings representing group elements. This situation is pictured in Figure 1.
Associated with each Bn is a group denoted G(Bn) whose elements form some subset of Σ
n and
whose group structure is determined by the function Bn. If x, y ∈ G(Bn) then yx = z for the
unique value of z that satisfies B(0, b, x, y) = (0, b, x, z) for each b ∈ Σ. Similarly, if x, y ∈ G(Bn)
then yx−1 = z for the unique value of z that satisfies B(1, b, x, y) = (1, b, x, z). The first input bit
(the control bit) thus determines whether y is multiplied (on the right) by x or by x−1. Whenever
we have x 6∈ G(Bn) or y 6∈ G(Bn), then it must be the case that B(c, b, x, y) = (c,¬b, x, y) for each
b, c ∈ Σ, i.e., the error bit b is negated to indicate that the inputs were not valid group elements.
Naturally, the constraint that must be obeyed by each Bn in order for B = {Bn} to be considered a
group oracle is that there must exist a family of underlying groups {Gn} along with encodings {fn}
(each fn : Gn → Σn one-to-one and satisfying fn(Gn) = G(Bn)) that yields the above structure.
Each group G(Bn), and more generally any subgroup of G(Bn) given by a list of generators, is
known as a black-box group.
For a given group oracle B each Bn is invertible, and may therefore be viewed as a (2n+2)-qubit
quantum gate as suggested by Figure 1. When we say that a polynomial-time uniformly generated
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Bn
c
b
x
y
c
b′ =
{
b if x, y ∈ G(Bn)
¬b otherwise
x
z =


yx if c = 0 and x, y ∈ G(Bn)
yx−1 if c = 1 and x, y ∈ G(Bn)
y otherwise
Figure 1: Reversible gate for a black-box group
family of quantum circuits has access to group oracle B, we mean that the circuits in the family
may, in addition to the standard gates mentioned previously, be composed of any of the gates in
the collection {Bn}. Note that any quantum circuit containing a Bn gate must have size Ω(n).
3 Verification of non-membership
In this section we prove that the Group Non-Membership problem is in QMA for an arbitrary group
oracle B. Before giving the technical proof, we will discuss informally the basic idea of the proof.
Suppose group elements g1, . . . , gk and h are given, and let us write H = 〈g1, . . . , gk〉. Consider
the state |H|−1/2∑g∈H |g〉, and assume that this state is contained in a quantum register R. In
general, given any finite set A we will let |A〉 denote the state |A|−1/2∑a∈A |a〉, so that we may say
that R is in state |H〉. In addition let B be a register consisting of a single qubit, and suppose B
is initialized to state (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2. Assuming we have a gate that performs group operations as
discussed in the previous section, we may built a quantum circuit acting onR and B that effectively
acts as a controlled-multiply-by-h operation on R, where B is the control. If this operation is
performed, we may express the resulting state of the pair (B,R) as (|0〉|H〉 + |1〉|Hh〉)/√2. Now
perform a Hadamard transform on B to yield the state
1
2
|0〉(|H〉 + |Hh〉) + 1
2
|1〉(|H〉 − |Hh〉).
At this point, observing B in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis yields 1 with probability p = ‖(|H〉 − |Hh〉)/2‖2.
In case h ∈ H we have |H〉 = |Hh〉, and so p = 0; in case h 6∈ H we have that |H〉 and |Hh〉 are
orthogonal, and so p = 1/2. Thus, given several copies of the state |H〉 one may determine with
very high probability whether or not h ∈ H.
Unfortunately, the state |H〉 may be difficult to construct in some cases, but it may be given
as a quantum certificate. Naturally we may not assume that a given certificate |ψ〉 coincides with
|H〉, so this must be verified before the above test is performed. In fact, it is not necessary to
check that |ψ〉 = |H〉, but only that |ψ〉 is invariant under right multiplication by elements of H.
Our technique to do this is as follows. Consider a (classical) randomized procedure for generating
elements of H uniformly (for now we assume this is possible without error—we will take errors into
account in the proof below). We may modify such a probabilistic process to make it quantum by
simulating the act of choosing any random number in some given range {0, . . . , N − 1} by using a
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quantum transformation QN satisfying QN |0〉 = N−1/2
∑N−1
a=0 |a〉, and simulating the entire process
reversibly. (To do this, assume all random choices are made first, and that the remaining part of
the process is deterministic and hence can be simulated reversibly.) Let F denote the resulting
quantum transformation. It will not be the case that F produces |H〉, but rather we will have
F : |0〉 7→ 1√|H|
∑
g∈H
|g〉| garbage(g)〉
for | garbage(g)〉 denoting some arbitrary unit vector representing whatever is left over from this
process (for instance, copies of the simulated random numbers yielding the random choice of g in
superposition). Now, to check that the state contained in R, which purportedly contains |H〉, is
invariant under right multiplication by elements of H, we do the following: (i) apply F to some
register S that is initially in the state |0〉, (ii) multiply (on the right) the contents of R by the
“random” group element contained in S, (iii) apply F † to S, and (iv) observe S. If R was invariant
under multiplication by elements of H, then S will revert back to state |0〉 with certainty, while if
not there will be some probability that the observation of S yields some other result (indicating
that this certificate should be rejected). Under the assumption that the observation of S does yield
0, however, the state of R will in fact be changed (by quantum magic!) to one that is invariant
under right multiplication by elements in H. At this point, R will be suitable for the first test that
determines whether h ∈ H.
Before proceeding to the formal proof, we mention the following theorem due to Babai [5] that
will be used in the proof. The theorem essentially states that elements in a given black-box group
can be randomly generated in such a way that the resulting distribution is very close to uniform.
Theorem 1 (Babai) For any group oracle B there exists a randomized procedure P acting as
follows. On input g1, . . . , gk ∈ G(Bn) and ǫ > 0, P outputs an element of H = 〈g1, . . . , gk〉
in time polynomial in n + log 1/ǫ such that each g ∈ H is output with probability in the range
(1/|H| − ǫ, 1/|H| + ǫ).
This is in fact a weaker result than the one proved by Babai, but it is sufficient for our needs.
Now we are prepared to state and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 GNM(B) ∈ QMAB for any group oracle B.
Proof. As above, given any set A, we write |A〉 to denote the uniform superposition over elements
of A, i.e., |A〉 = |A|−1/2∑a∈A |a〉. Let g1, . . . , gk and h denote input group elements of length n,
let H = 〈g1, . . . , gk〉, and consider the procedure described in Figure 2.
Assume first that h 6∈ H. In this case we must prove that there exists a certificate |ψ〉 causing the
procedure to accept with high probability. The certificate will be |H〉. The verification procedure
first performs transformation F on S, which was initialized to |0〉 at the start of the procedure.
The state of the pair of registers (R,S) is now
|H〉
∑
g∈H
αg(|g〉| garbage(g)〉). (1)
The contents of register R is multiplied by the group element contained in S, which has no effect
on the state in (1) following from the fact that |H〉 is invariant under multiplication by any element
g ∈ H. Now the inverse of transformation F is applied, which returns S to the state |0〉 with
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Assume register R contains the quantum certificate, and all other registers are initialized to |0〉.
Let F be a transformation such that
F : |0〉 7→
∑
g∈H
αg|g〉| garbage(g)〉,
where |αg|2 ∈
(
1/|H| − 2−2n, 1/|H| + 2−2n) for each g ∈ H, and | garbage(g)〉 denotes some ar-
bitrary unit vector that depends on g. The fact that transformation F can be performed in by
polynomial-time uniform quantum circuits follows from Theorem 1, as described previously.
Step 1:
Using the group oracle, check that R contains a valid element of G(Bn). Reject if this is not the
case.
Apply transformation F to register S.
Using the group oracle, multiply the contents of register R by the group element contained in S.
Apply transformation F † to S. If S does not contain 0, then reject. Otherwise proceed to step 2.
Step 2:
Apply Hadamard transform to an initialized register B (i.e., set register B to state (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2).
Using the group oracle, perform a controlled-multiply-by-h operation on register R, where B is the
control bit. (Specifically, this operation has the effect of multiplying the contents of register R on
the right by h if B has value 1, and has no effect if B has value 0.)
Perform a Hadamard transform on B, and reject if B contains 0.
If the computation has not rejected thus far, then accept.
Figure 2: Quantum verification procedure for Group Non-Membership.
certainty. The probability that the verification procedure rejects in step 1 is therefore 0. Now step
2 is performed. After preparing register B and performing the controlled-multiply-by-h operation,
the state of the pair (B,R) is (|0〉|H〉 + |1〉|Hh〉)/√2. A Hadamard transform is performed on B,
producing the state
1
2
|0〉(|H〉 + |Hh〉) + 1
2
|1〉(|H〉 − |Hh〉).
Under the assumption h 6∈ H, we have that |H〉 and |Hh〉 are orthogonal, and consequently the
probability of acceptance is ‖(|H〉 − |Hh〉)/2‖2 = 1/2.
Now suppose h ∈ H and let |ψ〉 denote the initial state of register R. In this case our goal is to
bound the probability of acceptance. Let us write
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈G(Bn)
βx|x〉+ |γ〉
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for |γ〉 ∈ span{|x〉 : x 6∈ G(Bn)} denoting the “invalid” portion of |ψ〉. The verification procedure
first checks that R contains a superposition over valid elements of G(Bn), which has the effect
of projecting the state of R to
∑
x∈G(Bn)
βx|x〉 (renormalized) in case this test does not result in
rejection. As we are interested in bounding the overall (unconditional) probability of accepting,
however, we need not renormalize this state. Transformation F is performed on S, and the group
element contained in S is multiplied to the contents of R, producing state∑
x∈G(Bn)
∑
g∈H
αgβx|xg〉|g〉| garbage(g)〉
in registers (R,S). Now F † is applied to S and the verification procedure rejects if S has not been
returned to it’s initial 0 value. Under the assumption that an observation of S reveals 0 (which is
necessary if the procedure accepts), the state of register R becomes∑
x∈G(Bn)
∑
g∈H
αgβx|xg〉〈0|F †(|g〉| garbage(g)〉) =
∑
x∈G(Bn)
∑
g∈H
|αg|2βx|xg〉
(where again we do not renormalize in order to calculate the unconditional probability of accep-
tance). Now step 2 is performed. After the controlled-multiply-by-h and Hadamard operations
have been performed, the state of the pair (B,R) will be
1
2
|0〉
∑
x∈G(Bn)
∑
g∈H
(|αg|2βx|xg〉 + |αg|2βx|xgh〉) + 1
2
|1〉
∑
x∈G(Bn)
∑
g∈H
(|αg|2βx|xg〉 − |αg|2βx|xgh〉) .
The probability of acceptance is therefore
1
4
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x∈G(Bn)
∑
g∈H
(|αg|2βx|xg〉 − |αg|2βx|xgh〉)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (2)
Under the assumption that h ∈ H, we have that xgh and xg range over the same set as g ranges
over H. Thus we may rewrite (2) as
1
4
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x∈G(Bn)
∑
g∈H
βx
(|αg|2 − |αgh−1|2) |xg〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (3)
By the triangle inequality, we see that (3) is at most
1
4

∑
g∈H
(|αg|2 − |αgh−1|2)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x∈G(Bn)
βx|xg〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥


2
≤ 2−2n.
Thus we have that the verification procedure accepts with exponentially small probability.
The definition of QMA requires that positive instances be accepted with probability at least
2/3 and negative instances to be accepted with probability at most 1/3. Thus, we must address
the fact that although our verification procedure accepts with exponentially small probability for
all certificates on negative instances, the probability of acceptance is only guaranteed to be 1/2
for positive instances. As discussed in Section 2, this may be remedied by running several copies
of the verification procedure in parallel and deciding to accept or reject depending on the number
of parallel executions that accept. In the present case we may achieve exponentially small proba-
bility of error by running a polynomial number of copies of the above verification procedure on a
compound certificate and accepting if and only if at least one of the copies accepts.
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4 Oracle separations
In this section we discuss oracle separations regarding MA, QMA, and BQP. First, we prove that
there exists a group oracle B relative to which the Group Non-Membership problem is not contained
in MA, and thus MAB ( QMAB . Our proof follows the same general ideas used by Babai [5, 6] to
prove GNM 6∈ NP and GNM 6∈ BPP for some group oracles. We then identify a restricted version
of the Group Non-Membership problem, which we call the 2-Element Group Non-Membership
problem, that in fact is contained in BQP but still lies outside of MA relative to the group oracle
B. Thus we have an oracle separating BQP and MA. A stronger result was claimed by Bernstein
and Vazirani [13], but their proof has not yet appeared—they claimed the existence of an oracle
relative to which EQP is not contained in MA.
The oracle separations we prove rely on a strong amplification property possessed by MA, which
is that the probability of error can be made much smaller than the reciprocal of the number of
possible certificates for each input length. With this in mind, we take the following as our definition
of MAB :
Definition 2 For a given group oracle B, a language A is in MAB if there exists a predicate R,
computable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine with access to the group oracle
B, and polynomials q and r, such that for every x ∈ Σ∗ we have:
If x ∈ A, then there exists y ∈ Σq(|x|) such that
∣∣∣{z ∈ Σr(|x|)
∣∣∣R(x, y, z) = 1}
∣∣∣ = 2r(|x|).
If x 6∈ A, then for all y ∈ Σq(|x|),
∣∣∣{z ∈ Σr(|x|) ∣∣∣ R(x, y, z) = 1}∣∣∣ < 2−2q(|x|)2r(|x|).
This definition also includes the fact that the error can be made one-sided without changing the
resulting class (see, for instance, Zachos [29])—a property that we do not know holds for QMA.
This fact is not essential in our proof, but has the advantage of simplifying our analysis.
Theorem 3 There exists a group oracle B for which we have GNM(B) 6∈ MAB.
Proof. For each n ≥ 4, let p(n) be a prime number satisfying 2n−2 < p(n)2 < 2n. Existence of
such a sequence of primes follows from Bertrand’s Postulate, first proved by Chebyshev (see, for
instance, Rosser and Schoenfeld [25]). Let [p(n)2] denote the set {1, . . . , p(n)2}, and for fixed n
identify each element of [p(n)2] with its representation as an n-bit string in binary. Let F(n) denote
the set of one-to-one functions of the form f : [p(n)2]→ Zp(n) × Zp(n), and define
F1(n) = {f ∈ F(n) | f(1) = (1, 0) and f(2) = (0, 1)} ,
F0(n) = {f ∈ F(n) | f(1) = (1, 0) and f(2) = (a, 0)for some a ∈ {2, . . . , p(n)− 1}}.
We have |F0(n)| = (p(n)−2)|F1(n)|. Associated with each f ∈ F(n) is a black-box group isomorphic
to Zp(n) × Zp(n) that labels each (α, β) ∈ Zp(n) × Zp(n) with the n-bit string f−1(α, β). When n is
fixed, or understood from context, we will simply write p, F0, F1, etc., to mean p(n), F0(n), F1(n),
etc.
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We will restrict our attention to the case where the input to the GNM problem consists of
the pair of n-bit strings representing labels 1 and 2 in binary for some n—we will write this pair
as (1, 2)n in order to stress the dependence on n. Furthermore, we also restrict our attention to
the case that the group oracle is associated with some f ∈ F1(n) ∪ F0(n) for each n as described
previously. For fixed n, if the group in question is associated with f ∈ F1, then f(2) 6∈ 〈f(1)〉, and
so (1, 2)n is a positive instance of GNM. If the group is associated with f ∈ F0, then f(2) ∈ 〈f(1)〉,
and so (1, 2)n is a negative instance of GNM.
Below we will diagonalize over all polynomial time oracle Turing machines in order to prove the
existence of B as in the statement of the theorem. First, let us consider an arbitrary polynomial-
time deterministic oracle Turing machine M , and let q, r, and t be strictly increasing polynomials
such that the following holds: for any x ∈ Σ∗, y ∈ Σq(|x|), and z ∈ Σr(|x|), M runs in time t(|x|)
on input (x, y, z) and any group oracle B. (Here, x, y, and z are as in the definition of MA, i.e.,
x corresponds to the input, y is a certificate, and z is treated as a sequence of random bits.) As
mentioned above, we are interested in the case where x = (1, 2)n for some n. Write m = |x| for such
a choice of x, and for simplicity assume our encoding of pairs of strings is such that 2n ≤ m ≤ 4n.
At this point we will fix n sufficiently large such that 8t(4n)2 < 2n/2 (and thus t(m)2/p(n) < 1/4).
Let B be an arbitrary group oracle, and for any f ∈ F let us write Bf to denote the new group
oracle obtained by changing the behavior of B on elements of length n to be in accordance with f ,
as described above. Finally, let M(Bf , y, z) denote 1 if M accepts (x, y, z) given oracle Bf , and let
M(Bf , y, z) denote 0 otherwise. We claim that the following inequality holds for every y ∈ Σq(m)
and z ∈ Σr(m):
|{g ∈ F0 |M(Bg, y, z) = 1}| ≥
(
p− t(m)2) |{f ∈ F1 |M(Bf , y, z) = 1}| . (4)
The proof of this inequality is the main technical part of the proof of Theorem 3, and so we postpone
this part momentarily—for now assume that it is proved.
Suppose now that for every f ∈ F1 there exists a certificate y ∈ Σq(m) such thatM(Bf , y, z) = 1
for every z ∈ Σr(m) (which must be the case if M is really a valid machine for solving the Group
Non-Membership problem with respect to an arbitrary oracle). Since there are only 2q(m) possible
certificates, we conclude that one of the certificates must work for many different oracles, i.e., there
exists some fixed y such that for at least 2−q(m)|F1| choices of f ∈ F1 we have M(Bf , y, z) = 1 for
every z ∈ Σr(m). This implies
∑
z∈Σr(m)
|{f ∈ F1|M(Bf , y, z) = 1}| ≥ 2−q(m) |F1| 2r(m).
By (4) we therefore have
∑
g∈F0
∣∣∣{z ∈ Σr(m) ∣∣∣ M(Bg, y, z) = 1
}∣∣∣ = ∑
z∈Σr(m)
|{g ∈ F0 |M(Bg, y, z) = 1}|
≥ (p− t(m)2) 2−q(m) |F1| 2r(m).
Therefore, there must exist g ∈ F0 such that
∣∣∣{z ∈ Σr(m)
∣∣∣ M(Bg, y, z) = 1
}∣∣∣ ≥ (p − t(m)2) 2−q(m) |F1| 2r(m)|F0|
> 2−2q(m)2r(m).
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From this we conclude that for any polynomial time oracle Turing machine M and group oracle
B, there exists an integer n such that by modifying B only on elements of length n it is possible
to make M an invalid machine for the GNM problem; either there exists f ∈ F1(n) such that
no certificate causes M to accept (1, 2)n given group oracle Bf with certainty, or there exists
g ∈ F0(n) such that some certificate causes M to accept (1, 2)n given group oracle Bg with too
high a probability.
Now it is routine to prove there exists B as in the statement of the theorem by a diagonaliza-
tion argument. Let (M1, q1, r1), (M2, q2, r2), . . . , be an enumeration of all triples consisting of a
polynomial-time deterministic oracle Turing machine and a pair of strictly increasing polynomials.
Let t1, t2, . . . be a sequence of polynomials such that Mi runs in time ti(|x|) on each input (x, y, z)
and any group oracle B, assuming |y| = qi(|x|) and |z| = ri(|x|), for each i. Without loss of gener-
ality we may assume ti+1(m) > ti(m) for all i and m. We define B using a stage construction as
follows:
Stage 0:
Set B(0) to be an arbitrarily chosen group oracle, and set n0 = 4.
Stage i ≥ 1:
Choose ni be the smallest integer satisfying 2ni > ti−1(4ni−1) and 8ti(4ni)
2 < 2ni/2, and let mi
be the length of the encoding of the pair (1, 2)ni .
If there exists f ∈ F1(ni) such that for all y ∈ Σqi(mi) we have∣∣∣{z ∈ Σr(mi) ∣∣∣ Mi(B(i−1)f , y, z) = 1
}∣∣∣ < 2r(mi)
then let B(i) = B
(i−1)
f for any such f . Otherwise, as proved previously, there exists g ∈ F0(ni)
and y ∈ Σqi(mi) such that∣∣∣{z ∈ Σr(mi) ∣∣∣ Mi(B(i−1)g , y, z) = 1
}∣∣∣ > 2−2q(mi)2r(mi).
Set B(i) = B
(i−1)
g for any such g.
Finally, let B be the group oracle that, for each i, agrees with B(i) on all queries regarding elements
of length less than ni+1. (This group oracle is well-defined, since all changes to the oracle on stages
subsequent to stage i involve only elements of length at least ni+1.) It is now straightforward to
verify that GNM(B) 6∈ MAB by the construction of B, since no triple (Mi, qi, ri) can be valid
according to Definition 2.
It remains to prove the inequality (4). Define an equivalence relation ∼y,z on F × F for each
y ∈ Σq(m) and z ∈ Σr(m) as follows: f ∼y,z g if and only if f and g induce identical executions of
M for x = (1, 2)n, certificate y, and random bits z (i.e., on input ((1, 2)n, y, z)).
Let f ∈ F1, and consider the computation of M on input ((1, 2)n, y, z) given a group oracle
specified by f on length n elements. During this computation, there will be some number k of
queries to the oracle regarding length n elements, which we may express as
u1 ± v1 = w1,
... (5)
uk ± vk = wk
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(that is, the i-th query asks for ui + vi or ui − vi, and the answer given by the oracle is wi). Let L
denote the set {u1, v1, w1, . . . , uk, vk, wk} (i.e., the distinct length-n labels of group elements that
either appear in a query or a response), and let l denote the size of L. Without loss of generality
assume the labels 1 and 2 are in L. The above equations specify a k × l matrix A with entries in
{−1, 0, 1} in the following straightforward way: the columns of A are indexed by the labels in the
set L, and for each i = 1, . . . , k, the i-th row of A only has nonzero entries corresponding to labels
ui, vi, and wi. In case the ith query was ui + vi = wi, the entries for the columns indexed by ui,
vi, and wi will be 1, 1, and −1, respectively, and in case the ith query was ui − vi = wi, the entries
will be 1, −1, and −1, respectively.
At this point it will be convenient to view Zp × Zp as being the additive group of the field
F = GF (p2) in order to easily apply well-known theorems from linear algebra to our analysis.
(Here the specific correspondence between Zp×Zp and F is arbitrary, so long as the additive group
structure is preserved.) Note that for any g satisfying f ∼y,z g, we must have that the values g
assigns to the labels in L form a vector in the nullspace of A (viewing A as a matrix over F).
Let d be the dimension of the nullspace of A. We claim that
|{g ∈ F0 | f ∼y,z g}| ≥
(
p− 1−
(
l
2
))(
p2d−4 −
(
l
2
)
p2d−6
)
(p2 − l)! (6)
and
|{g ∈ F1 | f ∼y,z g}| ≤ p2d−4(p2 − l)!. (7)
This suffices to prove (4), since by (6) and (7) we determine that for all f ∈ F1 we have
|{g ∈ F0 | f ∼y,z g}| ≥ (p− t(n)2) |{g ∈ F1 | f ∼y,z g}| ,
and summing over those equivalence classes for which M(Bf , y, z) = 1 yields (4).
The inequality (7) is immediate since the collection of vectors in the nullspace of A that assign
values (1, 0) and (0, 1) to the labels 1 and 2, respectively, is a hyperplane of dimension d− 2, and
each vector in this hyperplane can be extended to yield at most (p2 − l)! distinct g ∈ F1 with
g ∼y,z f .
To prove (6), let us define
Ha = {h ∈ F l |Ah = 0, h[1] = (1, 0), and h[2] = (a, 0)}
for each a ∈ {2, . . . , p− 1}, and define
T = {h ∈ F l |h[i] 6= h[j] for i 6= j}.
We will prove that there are at least p − 1 − ( l2) values of a for which Ha ∩ T contains at least
p2d−4 − ( l2)p2d−6 elements. As each h ∈ Ha ∩ T may be extended to yield (p2 − l)! distinct g ∈ F0
with g ∼y,z f , we will have proved (6).
Suppose Ha ∩ T is nonempty for a ∈ {2, . . . , p − 1}. Then of course Ha is nonempty, and is
therefore a hyperplane of dimension d − 2. We may also conclude that for each pair i 6= j ∈ L,
the intersection of Ha with the subspace Ji,j = {h ∈ F l |h[i] = h[j]} is properly contained in Ha,
and is therefore a hyperplane of dimension at most d − 3. Since T = F l \
(⋃
i6=j Ji,j
)
, there must
therefore be at least p2(d−2) − ( l2)p2(d−3) elements in Ha ∩ T as required.
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Thus, it remains to prove that Ha ∩ T is nonempty for at least p − 1 −
( l
2
)
values of
a ∈ {2, . . . , p − 1}. In order to prove this, define a mapping ϕa : Zp × Zp → Zp × Zp for each
a ∈ {2, . . . , p − 1} as ϕa(α, β) = (α + aβ, 0). Let hf ∈ F l denote the vector corresponding to the
values assigned to the labels in L by f , and let ϕa(hf ) denote the vector obtained by applying ϕa
to each entry of hf individually. Following from the fact that each ϕa is a homomorphism, we must
have that ϕa(hf ) is in the nullspace of A, and therefore ϕa(hf ) ∈ Ha. Write hf [i] = (αi, βi) for each
i, and suppose we have ϕa(hf [i]) = ϕa(hf [j]) for some pair i 6= j. Then αi+aβi ≡ αj+aβj ( mod p),
and so a(βi−βj) ≡ αj−αi (mod p). Since hf [i] 6= hf [j] (as f assigns distinct values to each label),
it is impossible that βi = βj , and so a ≡ (βi − βj)−1(αj − αi) (mod p). It follows that there are at
most
(
l
2
)
nonzero values of a such that ϕa(hf ) 6∈ Ha ∩ T , which completes the proof.
Finally, we consider a restricted case of the Group Non-Membership problem where there are
only two input group elements (i.e., k = 1 in the statement of the GNM problem).
2-Element Group Non-Membership (2-GNM)
Instance: Group elements g and h in some group G.
Question: Is h outside the group generated by g (i.e., is h 6∈ 〈g〉)?
We note that this problem can be solved in BQP for any group oracle B using Shor’s algorithm.
Proposition 4 2-GNM(B) ∈ BQPB for any group oracle B.
As this problem is not contained in (classical) MA relative to the group oracle B constructed in
the proof of Theorem 3, we have obtained the relation BQPB 6⊆ MAB.
Corollary 5 There exists an oracle B such that BQPB 6⊆ MAB.
5 Other problems having succinct quantum proofs
Quantum certificates for group non-membership may be used in conjunction with classical cer-
tificates for other group properties to obtain succinct quantum certificates for various problems
regarding finite groups. A few examples are given in this section.
Consider the following problems:
Proper Subgroup
Instance: Elements g1, . . . , gk and h1, . . . , hl in some group G.
Question: Is 〈h1, . . . , hl〉 a proper subgroup of 〈g1, . . . , gk〉?
Divisor of Order
Instance: Elements g1, . . . , gk in some group G and an integer N .
Question: Does N divide the order of 〈g1, . . . , gk〉?
Simple Group
Instance: Elements g1, . . . , gk in some group G.
Question: Is 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 a simple group?
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Intersection
Instance: Elements g1, . . . , gk, h1, . . . , hl, and a1, . . . , at in some group G.
Question: Is 〈a1, . . . , at〉 equal to the intersection of 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 and 〈h1, . . . , hl〉?
Centralizer
Instance: Elements g1, . . . , gk, h1, . . . , hl and a in some group G.
Question: Is 〈h1, . . . , hl〉 equal to the centralizer of a in 〈g1, . . . , gk〉?
Maximal Normal Subgroup
Instance: Elements g1, . . . , gk and h1, . . . , hl in some group G.
Question: Is 〈h1, . . . , hl〉 a maximal normal subgroup of 〈g1, . . . , gk〉?
The first two problems, Proper Subgroup and Divisor of Order, are in QMAB for any group
oracle B, while neither is in MAB for appropriate choice of B. Quantum certificates for these
problems may be obtained by combining quantum certificates for non-membership with classical
certificates for other properties.
In the case of Proper Subgroup this is straightforward: a quantum proof that 〈h1, . . . , hl〉 is
properly contained in 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 may consist of a classical portion that certifies that each hi may
be generated from g1, . . . , gk and identifies an element a ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 that purportedly lies outside
of 〈h1, . . . , hl〉, while the quantum portion certifies that a 6∈ 〈h1, . . . , hl〉.
In the case of Divisor of Order, the quantum proof is slightly more complicated: for each prime
power pl dividing N , the quantum proof identifies a tower of p-subgroups
〈h1〉 ≤ 〈h1, h2〉 ≤ · · · ≤ 〈h1, . . . , hl〉
of 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 having the property hi 6∈ 〈h1, . . . , hi−1〉 for each i (so that 〈h1, . . . , hl〉 has order at
least pl). The p-subgroup property may be certified classically [10], while each hi 6∈ 〈h1, . . . , hi−1〉
may be certified with a quantum proof of non-membership.
The remaining four problems, Simple Group, Intersection, Centralizer, and Maximal Normal
Subgroup, are in co-QMAB for any group oracle B. For the complements of each of these problems,
quantum proofs may be obtained from quantum proofs for non-membership along with classical
proofs for various properties as above. For the case of Simple Group and Maximal Normal Subgroup,
we rely on the fact that there exist classical certificates for the property of one group being normal
in another [6]. We leave the details for the reader.
6 Open Problems
We conclude by mentioning some open problems relating to quantum proofs and the class QMA.
• Is Graph Non-Isomorphism in QMA?
• Is Group Order in QMA? (That is, given group elements g1, . . . , gk and an integer N , are
there succinct quantum proofs for the property N = |〈g1, . . . , gk〉|?)
• Is co-NP contained in QMA? Do unexpected consequences result from such a containment?
• We have claimed that QMA ⊆ PP; can a better upper-bound be placed on the power of
QMA? What other relations among QMA and other classes can be proved?
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